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What’s he building? Activating the utopian imagination with Trump  
 
President Trump revels in his reputation as a builder. ‘Nobody,’ he said during his campaign, ‘builds 
walls better than me.’  
(Heathcote, 2017) 
 
Maybe Trump is a kind of cry for help from the Earth, a human flare. 
 (Boyle, 2017) 
 





Can one sell any positive value of Trump’s presidency to an academic audience? The editors of this special 
series invited polemical essays (Robinson and Bristow, 2017), but maybe asking readers to consider the 
merit of Trump is going a little too far? We put forward the argument here that as critical scholars we simply 
cannot allow ourselves to be swept up in the bien-pensant tide of Trump-trashing, which has almost become 
as addictive as the current reality-TV quality of the US presidency itself. As Roitman (2014: 9) has suggested 
in a different context, ‘the concept of crisis is crucial to the “how” of thinking otherwise’. Thus, we believe it 
crucial to seize the crisis of the Trump presidency as an opportunity to activate the utopian imagination, 
rather than an occasion for moralizing judgements or regressive nostalgia which would effectively mean 
aligning ourselves with the neo-liberal consensus many of us spent our careers critiquing. We further argue 
that Fredric Jameson’s (2009) notion of the dialectic may go some way to refreshing our critical conceptual 
arsenal in these disorienting times. This dialectical approach is meant to alter not only how we see reality, 
but also what we think we can do with it. It enables us to see the traumatic event of Trump’s election as 
providing a form and space through which contradictions that have been locked firmly into place in our 
socioeconomic set-up over the past few decades have become much more malleable, partly because of their 
increased visibility.  
 
What’s he building?  
We have borrowed the title of our essay from a nasty little tale which finds its inspiration in the darker 
recesses of Americana: the morally ambiguous Tom Waits song What’s he building?i which is about lurking 
horror, but also about paranoia and irrational fear of the unknown. Just as Tom Waits opens up to us a 
window on the psychosphere of the age in which we are living, perhaps we should also pay serious attention 
to the world that Trump makes visible for us, the world that he is projecting, ‘because it is part of the 
(despairing and sad) world in which we dwell’ (Berardi, 2017: 81). But the song is also about a certain 
obsession and fascination with the dark and perverse, and we suggest that in developing a critical position 
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vis-à-vis our current predicaments we have to acknowledge this ‘fascination with and excitement at 
everything perverse and suspicious, unclean and scurrilous, about the beast itself’ (Jameson, 1998: 149). 
The Trump administration has certainly not lacked in aggression (e.g. the ‘Muslim travel ban’), obscenity 
(e.g. Scaramucci’s gleefully reported comments on his White House colleagues) and sheer nastiness (e.g. 
Trump blaming ‘many sides’ for the Charlottesville violence). Perry Anderson’s (2017: 58) description of the 
Trump cabinet of ‘bankers and businessmen, generals and a couple of politicos of right-wing stamp’ as 
having stepped straight out of a George Grosz paintingii seems a painfully accurate description of the key 
men – and men they mostly are – surrounding Trump as he continues his increasingly surreal building 
project. And yet, there is a real danger of being swept away in the torrent of Twitter feeds and thus pushed 
into a simple ritualistic moralizing response of being ‘Anti-Trump’. What we advocate here is a moral 
complexity, which, to repurpose a favourite Trumpian turn of phrase, involves wading into the swamp and 
getting intimate with discomfort (Nelson, 2011).  
 
We believe that our task as a CMS community is to search for and apply concepts and percepts that 
somehow can capture and develop an immanent possibility in the reality of Trump. Our possible actions are 
only identifiable as such in terms of the language in which we describe them, and this essay, therefore, 
attempts to cultivate a more radical understanding of the Trump presidency than is put forward by its main 
critics. In proceeding thus, we take our inspiration from Jameson’s dialectical treatment of current societal 
phenomena, in particular his key work Valences of the Dialectic (2009) in which he performed a dialectical 
reading of the giant retail corporation Wal-Mart, thinking the negative and the positive together at one and 
the same time. The premise is that even the most obnoxious of phenomena can serve as a springboard for 
unsuspected utopian impulses. It is a rebuke to those whom Jameson polemically calls ‘moralizers’, who 
want ‘to have the luxury of condemning this evil without particularly imagining anything else in its place’ 
(Jameson, 2009: 421). Jameson’s initial characteristic of Wal-Mart is very much reminiscent of the 
considered academic opinion of Trump these days: ‘The picture is unappetizing, and the prospects for the 
future… are positively frightening and even, particularly if you have a bent for conspiracy theory, dystopian in 
the extreme’ (Jameson, 2009: 420). He conceives of Wal-Mart as the negation of the negation in the Marxist 
vocabulary; as a ‘peculiar contradiction… not an aberration or an exception, but rather the purest expression 
of that dynamic of capitalism which devours itself, which abolishes the market by means of the market itself’ 
(Jameson, 2009: 421). Yet, Jameson (2009: 423) is able to express an ‘aesthetic appreciation… for this 
achievement’ (and indeed, did Trump not confound general expectations with his quite astounding electoral 
victory?), but such ‘admiration and positive judgement must be accompanied by the absolute condemnation 
that completes the dialectical ambivalence.’  
 
Let there be no misunderstanding: we have no expectation whatsoever that anything ‘positive/progressive’ 
can come from Trump’s presidency; yet to apprehend the Trump phenomenon in ‘positive/constructive’ terms 
is to enable a move away from the status quo and to open up the currently dominant social order to potential 
reconfiguration. It can thus provide an impetus for moving beyond present constraints rather than a mere 
occasion for moralizing judgements with its attendant hopes of ‘containment’ and pleas for a quick return to 
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the status quo. Thus, we may use the destabilising quality of Trump’s building project as an opportunity for 
activating the intellectual capacity that Jameson calls ‘utopian imagination’. For Jameson (2009) this does 
not mean drafting alternative blueprints of some ideal social system, as  
 
…what is important in a Utopia is not what can be positively imagined and proposed, but rather what 
is not imaginable and not conceivable. Utopia… is not a representation but an operation calculated 
to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the future, the lines beyond which we do not seem 
able to go in imagining changes in our own society and world (except in the direction of dystopia and 
catastrophe)… What is essential in Utopianism is not the ingenious economic scheme… so much as 
it is collectivity as such (413-414). 
In what follows, we will seek to use two aspects of the Trump phenomenon to disclose and push beyond 
current limits: post-truth and populism.  
 
Reconfiguring post-truth 
Publications as politically far apart as the Financial Times (Luce, 2017) and the London Review of Books 
(Crewe, 2017) or New Left Review (Anderson, 2017) have pointed out that the events of Trump and Brexit 
are a reflex to the state of our social system and its economic structure, and thus a symptom rather than a 
cause. There seems to be a broad agreement that the past quarter century of liberal triumph and 
consolidation effectively prepared the individual ingredients that enabled the events of 2016. Whether one 
calls it global capitalism, neoliberalism or ‘just-the-way-things-are going’, it is clear that a certain proportion of 
the population felt so disenfranchised that they engaged in a nihilistic rebellion against a system that had 
routinely blamed them for their own plight. Indeed, as Hochschild (2016) shows through her impressive 
voyage into the heartland of white America, a significant part of the people we have come to know as Tea 
Partiers, Alt-Righters, or Trump Supporters – or, in Hilary Clinton’s infelicitous phrase, ‘basket of deplorables’ 
– are not just driven by malign sentiment, but by a deep-felt sense of cultural marginalization and economic 
downfall (see also Ashbee, 2017 for an account emphasizing the structural character of US anti-statism).  
 
So far, so consensual; where we get a little more controversial is where it concerns Trump’s post-truth 
regime. While we agree that the regime is outrageous, does Trump not stumble upon a dark kernel of truth? 
This kernel may open up a space to re-consider how, for many decades, presumptive stability has already 
relied on post-factual politics. People needed to be convinced that the capitalist system worked – and that is 
how politicians from Bush to Obama, from Blair to Cameron, scored it: ‘Increased prosperity for all’! Precisely 
because neoliberal globalization was far from actually delivering the ‘prosperity for all’ that it promised, it had 
to develop ‘the propagation of illusions into the fine art of democratic government’ (Streeck, 2017: 9). Yet, 
the words that described and conceptualized the social and economic spheres seemed to coincide less and 
less with the actual experience of many human lives (Tally, 2014). Should we, therefore, not welcome 
Trump’s ‘fake news’ mantra as it makes us consider the unreality of much of the information provided by the 
traditional media and institutions of global capitalism? Did ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ prior to the US presidential 
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election and the Brexit referendum not also connote a largely unexamined set of assumptions about the way 
politics works and the degree of change it allows for – assumptions largely shared by the media and 
politicians, on the right and the left (Crewe, 2017)? Asking these, admittedly rhetorical, questions does not 
imply agreement with anything Trump says, but it does suggest that the post-truth era neither originated with 
Trump’s election nor will end with himiii. Trump propagates outrageous lies, but that is not quite the point. 
The Trump spectacle in a perverse way makes strange the very acts of thinking, articulation and 
representation we have become accustomed to, allowing us also (but not necessarily) to envision and, 
perhaps, implement new and better criteria of socioeconomic and political judgement.  
 
Zevin’s (2017: 38) sarcastic description of Silicon Valley business executives who are now treated by The 
New York Times ‘as if they were sites of resistance on a par with the maquis’ is apposite in this context as 
are expositions of the profound irony of the liberal press putting their faith in the wisdom and prudence of the 
intelligence community and military in order the save the country from Trump’s excesses (Shatz, 2017; 
Bromwich, 2017). A dialectical reading would suggest that something can be factually incorrect and 
misleading (i.e. what Trump actually says) while also pointing to an affective truth which people instinctively 
‘get’ (i.e. the entrenched privileges of the press as part of the apparatus of state and their role in perpetuating 
it). The trendy notions of ‘post-factual’ and ‘post-truth’ are problematic concepts in so far as they presuppose 
the existence of universally shared, accepted ‘truths’ pre-2016 which shroud the pre-Trump, pre-Brexit 
period in a myth of munificence and objectivity. However, was it not neoliberalism and its attendant 
postmodern cultural logic that made meaning and coherence relative, loosely accountable to facts? Would it 
not be particularly ironic for the CMS community that after championing for years a constructivist position in 
opposition to mainstream functionalism, we would get seduced by ‘a sudden rediscovery of objective truth for 
the purpose of insulting non-academic fellow-citizens,’ as Streeck (2017: 9) puts it? In fact, has 
‘denaturalization’, that merciless task of ‘deconstructing the “reality” of organizational life or ”truthfulness” of 
organizational knowledge,’ not always been a core principle in critical management research (Fournier & 
Grey, 2000: 181)?  
 
Reconfiguring ‘post-truth’ as a place of opportunity does not imply an ‘anything goes’ approach. It asks us 
not to dismiss facts, but alerts us to how facts are configured and to how Trump extends and enhances 
existing figurations rather than breaking with them. Hence, we should resist the temptation of wanting to 
restore the status quo ante Trump, which not so long ago we perceived to be pretty grievous. Instead, we 
should, amidst all the high-pitched media-drama of the Trump presidency, become more attentive to what is 
borne at the ‘the lower frequencies’ of human experience: the quotidian humiliations, ‘inflected at an insistent 
pace, or punctuated, mercilessly, in non-verbal registers’ (Ellison, 1952: 579). Tuning into such deeper 
channels may make us more vigilant as to what is excised from the imagined order of things and what is 
always affirmed as clear, reasonable, and common sense (Stoler, 2016). Such attunement would require a 
different kind of ‘truth’ where trauma and suffering are considered a state of being that saturates ordinary life 
rather than an exception to it (Berlant, 2011; Povinelli, 2011). What Shatz (2017: 17) sees as paradoxical, we 
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should consider dialectically; ‘that a cipher of a man has revealed the hidden depths, the ugly unmastered 
history, of the country he claims to lead.’  
 
The masses against the classes  
Seeing the revelation of post-truth as a moment of opportunity, implies an extension of the concept of 
populism, which has been used by the media and institutions of liberal internationalism as a strongly 
negative polemical term, expressing a suspicion of politics formed through mass democratic mobilization 
(Streeck, 2017). For example, a recent hedge fund report on populism – like everything else, populism 
represents an investment opportunity whilst requiring risk management, of course – described it as ‘a 
political and social phenomenon that arises from the common man, typically not well educated, being fed 
up… a rebellion of the common man against the elites’ (Dalio et al., 2017: 2). We should not underestimate 
the danger of any claim to be speaking for ‘the common man’; there is no straightforward constituency that 
comprises ‘the people’ (Laclau, 2005a) and claims as to ‘what the people want’ or ‘what the people believe’ 
must be seen as brazen attempts to dress up one sectional view as having a larger legitimacy than others 
(Judis, 2016). Furthermore, the re-emerging cult of nation and ethnicity – expressed in terms such as 
‘heritage populism’ (Reynié, 2016) or more straightforwardly as the ‘Euro-American anti-global racist front’ 
(Berardi, 2017: 41) – is deeply troubling indeed. Yet, if we are to push beyond Trump, we must find ways of 
dealing with the ‘ugly side’ of the populist affinities in the CMS community as the editors of this special series 
implied (Robinson and Bristow, 2017: 435).  
 
Again, we must try to read a noxious phenomenon as also having a positive valence. As Müller (2016) has 
suggested, it is far too facile to describe a large part of the population as emotional basket cases waiting to 
be seduced by a charismatic demagogue; or even worse as some kind of ‘racist front’. People were and are 
angry and anxious for good reasons as they are looking for a matrix to make sense of their lives in a world 
that says their views don’t count and which can no longer sustain their organizing fantasies of ‘a good life’; a 
world where social structures have become increasingly unstable and unreliable and therefore uninstructive 
to people living in them (Berlant, 2011). Pain forces ‘people’ (in the plural) to look desperately for an order to 
the world that they cannot find, because it does not exist. In paying better attention to the ‘lower frequencies’ 
of human experience and framing them as trauma and suffering, rather than only racism and resentment, it 
may become possible again to imagine the notion of mass solidarity; that famous ‘collective actor’ of 
classical Marxism that, one day it hoped, would replace capitalism (Kunkel, 2014) – or, perhaps more 
accurately, it may confront us with our inability to imagine this ‘collective actor’ in our times which are 
precisely characterised by the ‘disappearance from the modern scene of the masses as a homogeneous 
body of social existence’ (Berardi, 2017: 112) and the ‘pulverization of collective agency in the course of the 
neoliberal revolution’ (Streeck, 2016: 13). It is inevitable there will be tension and antagonism (such as 
aggressive nationalism) within the masses nursed on descriptions of a society in which everything is, and 
ought to be for sale and who are ‘deeply embedded in bourgeois culture and incorrigibly wedded or indeed 
addicted to its benefits’ (Jameson, 2016b: 106), even when they scarcely enjoy them; but this is still no 




The craving for order and recognition explains the persistent devotion of what has been described as ‘the 
core Trump voter’. At a bizarre re-run of his election rallies in Virginia in August 2017, one of his supporters 
put it pithily: ‘He was the first person who cared about us. He’s very much in touch with the ordinary 
neighbourhood person that’s trying to make a living’ (Smith, 2017). In offering swagger and the illusion of 
certainty Trump feeds on and fortifies a deeply emotional rejection of existing social elites, constantly 
affirming he will not stop at anything in the defence of ‘his’ people; be it by building a ‘beautiful’ wall, reviving 
‘beautiful, clean’ coal or protecting ‘beautiful’ Confederate statues. This is an aestheticization of politics at its 
most basic level.iv More than anyone, Trump is instinctively aware that the masses are ‘always dangerously 
prone to break loose like a cannon across the deck, to wreak havoc’ (Jameson, 2016b: 106) and that their 
delight can easily turn into fury should they feel betrayed. In that sense, cultivating his own idea of himself is 
more important to Trump than running a government.  
 
Fight populism with populism 
As Trump turns inwards in an ever more bizarre display of self-contentment that has gone well beyond the 
level of narcissism we have come to expect of anyone in power (McAdams, 2016; Lee, 2017), one may 
question our insistence on his utopian potential. In denouncing Trump, how can we but return to a former 
saner world? Surely, the positive value of Trump has nothing to do with the actual content of his aggressive 
policies, but everything to do with the political dislocation that these policies express. Let us recall, Trump is 
a symptom, not a cause; his value lies not in the alternatives he offers, but in the desperate need for real 
alternatives he reveals. In all its awfulness, the Trump administration reminds us that social ‘truths’ and 
‘facts’ are provisional products of ongoing power struggles, and that none of these are irreversible. Trump 
reminds us that change is possible – for better and worse. But how do we heed this lesson without running 
the risk of corroborating its content as well as its form? How do we learn from Trump without colluding in his 
project? In other words, is it possible to adopt his building strategy without using his bricks?  
 
There are no hard and fast recipes for translating negative critique into a positive force for change without 
simultaneously accommodating the logic of the dominant order. Indeed, as Parker and Parker (2017) 
suggest, striking a balance between antagonism and accommodation is one of toughest but most pertinent 
challenges facing critical management scholars today. In the case of Trump, we believe that one place to 
start is by accepting Hochschild’s (2016) argument that the wrath of the disenfranchised masses should be 
read as unacknowledged grievances in search of political representation. There is no necessary connection 
between the feeling of cultural and economic marginalization that many Trump supporters experience and 
the solutions offered by Trump. Whether the marginalized articulate their grievances within a discourse of 
xenophobia and misogyny or within a discourse of liberty and equality is inherently contingent. This is 
arguably the reason that some former members of the Occupy Movement ended up backing Tea Party 
candidates in the 2012 election – and have since wandered ever further into the wilderness of the alt-right 
(Nagle, 2017: 16-17). Furthermore, it explains why the white working-class presumably voted against ‘its own 
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interests’ when electing Trump for president (Zeit, 2017). Hochschild (2016: 8) calls this ‘the great paradox’, 
but it is only paradoxical if interests are seen as objectively determined by socioeconomic demographics – 
and if the causal direction of political representation follows this logic of objective interests from represented 
to representative. However, interests are not independent and stable substances, but are at least partially 
determined by discourse, and representation runs both ways. If we begin from these premises, a new 
horizon of possibilities emerges. 
 
For one thing, we can appreciate that Trump is really good at mobilization, not in the sense of getting people 
to take to the streets (his inaugural speech made that painstakingly clear), but in the sense of unifying an 
otherwise irreconcilable constituency – often known as ‘the people’ – against a common enemyv. By most 
accounts, this is the basic definition of populism (Bossetta and Husted, 2017). Populism is – like its opposite, 
elitism – typically used as a pejorative term one may hurl against political opponents. As such, populism is 
regularly associated with demagogy, intellectual backwardness, authoritarianism; it is perceived as an 
ideological force that is ‘always detrimental to democracy’ (Boel et al., 2017: 72). However, in the work of 
Laclau (2005a; 2005b), this is not the case. Instead of viewing populism as a type of inconsistent ideology 
(Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017), a theatrical aesthetic (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014), or as an undemocratic 
movement personified by Trump, Farage, Wilders, and the likes (Müller, 2017), Laclau (2005b: 33) conceives 
of populism as a specific ‘logic of articulation.’ According to him, a discourse is more or less populist 
depending on the degree to which its political contents are articulated in ‘equivalential chains’ and positioned 
in an ‘agonistic’ (Mouffe, 2013) relationship vis-à-vis the established system. This means that those 
grievances that are represented by a populist discourse are not tied together by any substantial similarities, 
but by a common opposition to an adversary, often known as ‘the elite’ or ‘the establishment’. As Laclau 
(2005b: 47) puts it: ‘Populism means putting into question the institutional order by constructing an underdog 
as a historical agent – i.e. an agent which is an other in relation to the way things stand.’ 
 
Thus conceived, populism need not be condemned tout court. Rather, it should be seen as the mode of 
articulation by which counter-hegemonic projects are built and organized. Stripping the notion of populism of 
its ideological heritage allows us to see that it is, indeed, possible to separate Trump’s building strategy from 
his building project – as politicians like Bernie Sanders and parties like Podemos have already demonstrated 
in practice (Errejón and Mouffe, 2016). Trump’s strength consists in his ability to unite interests that seem 
worlds apart and to construct the ‘idea of Trump’ – a reality star and real estate tycoon – as an other in 
relation to the ‘the way things stand’. In his first year of office, the academic left has been asking itself to 
provide progressive answers to Trump. Perhaps the time has come to begin looking for a progressive 
version of Trump. What would our counter-hegemonic project look like, and how might it represent some of 
those grievances that Trump so skilfully mobilized during his electoral campaign? Fighting populism with 
populism may not seem like the most attractive solution, but at least it moves us beyond our ‘dumbfounded 





Post-Trump - or, what are we building?  
There are already some positive indications that the mobilization of populism against populism holds 
potential for activating the utopian imagination; for instance, in the form of mass demonstrations (the airport 
rallies, the women’s march, the immigrant marches, the march for science), which may energize swathes of 
the public into a sense of possibilities (with contingent and potentially negative as well as positive outcomes). 
The very fact of Trump’s election (and the same goes for Brexit) certainly has made many more aware of the 
strangeness of reality as such. The Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman (2016), for example, 
admitted on the night of Trump’s election victory that ‘people like me, and probably like most readers of The 
New York Times, truly didn’t understand the country we live in.’ People across the political spectrum are 
beginning to question more what is actually going on and why life is the way it is. But there is a danger that 
this re-awakening of the need for alternative futures, repressed and paralyzed for so long, gets drowned in 
the descent into verbal violence without precedent. Trump’s election has certainly created “a permanent 
emergency in the liberal imagination” (Lears, 2018: 15); the liberal opposition to the very idea of Trump has 
been growing ever shriller and indiscriminate during 2017, to the point that it has become very difficult to tell 
the difference between those who would like to contribute to the project of replacing a social order bent on 
economic polarization and ecological ruin with something better, and those who simply aim to restore 
America (and with it, the world) to where it was two years ago.  
 
Indeed, as his presidency is chaotically unfolding and failing to achieve much, it has become clear that 
Trump’s programme is short on ideological elaboration. He is certainly not an ideologue of interwar vintage 
as some vitriolic liberal commentators seem to imply, warning us that fascism is around the corner if not 
already in charge (Anderson, 2017). A more accurate, and we believe appropriately dark, interwar 
description of the empty transactional worldview that typifies Trump, the man, is the one provided by Bertolt 
Brecht in his Threepenny Novel from 1934, through the character of the businessman Peachum as quoted 
by Fredric Jameson (1998: 67) in his book on Brecht:  
 
After all, the intention of any businessman to deceive other people is an honourable one. Yet the 
world was even more rotten than one could imagine. There were no limits to its rottenness. This was 
Peachum’s deepest conviction, indeed his only genuine conviction. 
 
This is not to trivialise the significance of Trump’s election by any means – quite the opposite. Without any 
doubt, the result will be a long-lasting trauma in its own right, the effects of which cannot yet be estimated. 
Possibly, institutional inertia will get the better of Trump and we will have some return to business-as-usual 
(Anderson, 2017).Yet, political reversibility might prove impossible now popular rage has been directed into 
nationalist and racist channels (Berardi, 2017). The widespread cynicism amongst vast swathes of the 
population seems to rule out a seamless recovery of normative legitimacy for capitalism as a just society 
offering equal opportunities for individual progress (Streeck, 2016). When we talk about activating the 
utopian imagination in this context, we are certainly not suggesting that the spaces opened up by Trump are 
utopian in any sense. They are simply reconfigurations of the existent (and sometimes the darkly 
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antediluvian). Yet, the Trump presidency in all its unpredictability has somehow (for better and worse) shifted 
the weight and persistence of the present as such, and thereby offers us the potential to see in our given 
reality something other than what simply is supposed to be and to consider afresh the deeper currents and 
contradictory tendencies within our social order. Trump’s alternatives of dystopia, regression and appeals to 
‘Greatness’ confront us with the limitations of our tried and trusted modes of thinking; with our own historical 
inability to imagine utopia. This should make us realise, riffing on Walter Benjamin’s essay On the Concept 
of History, that ‘the catastrophe is not something awaiting us, but is simply the fact that all this goes on, 
continues to go on, exactly as it does’ (Jameson in Buchanan, 2006: 130). Activating the utopian imagination 
requires then, as Jameson put it rather poetically, ‘a psychotherapy of anti-utopian fears and draw them out 
into the light of day, where the sad passions like blinded snakes writhe and twist in the open air’ (Jameson, 






Anderson P (2017) Passing the baton. New Left Review 103: 41-64. 
 
Ashbee, E (2017) The Trump Revolt. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Berardi F (2017) Futurability. The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility. London: Verso. 
 
Berlant LG (2011) Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Boel N et al. (2017) Populism and the claim to a moral monopoly: An interview with Jan-Werner Müller. 
Politik 20(4): 71-85. 
 
Bossetta M and Husted E (2017) Introduction: Populism in the 21st century: Critical reflections on a global 
phenomenon. Politik 20(4): 1-9. 
 
Boyle F (2017) Maybe Trump is a kind of cry for help from the Earth, a human flare. The Guardian, 27 
August. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/27/frankie-boyle-donald-trump-
embodies-twitter (accessed 2 September 2017). 
 
Bromwich D (2017) The age of detesting Trump. London Review of Books 39(14): 9-12. 
 
Buchanan, I (2006). Fredric Jameson: Live Theory. London: Continuum. 
Coates S (2017) You can’t bank on Trump, May warned. The Financial Times, 19 August. Available at: 




Campbell J (2018) American Discontent: The Rise of Donald Trump and the Decline of the Golden Age. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Crewe T (2017) The new deal. London Review of Books 39(16): 15-17. 
 
Dalio R et al. (2017) Bridgewater Observations: Populism, the Phenomenon. Available at: 
http://www.obela.org/system/files/Populism.pdf (accessed 2 September 2017). 
 
Ellison R (1952) Invisible Man. New York: Random House. 
 
Errejón I and Mouffe C. (2016) Podemos: In the Name of the People. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd. 
 
Fournier V and Grey C (2000) At the critical moment: Conditions and prospects for Critical Management 
Studies. Human Relations 53(1): 7-32. 
 
Hazeldine T (2017) Revolt of the rustbelt. New Left Review 105: 51-79. 
 
Heathcote E (2017) Who’s going to build Trump’s wall? Financial Times, 28 April. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/f4806066-26a5-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025 (accessed 2 September 2017). 
 
Hochschild AR (2016) Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. New York: 
The New Press. 
 
Jameson F (1998) Brecht and Method. London: Verso. 
 
Jameson F (2009) Valences of the Dialectic. London: Verso. 
 
Jameson, F. (2016). An American Utopia. In S. Zizek (ed.) An American Utopia: Dual Power and the 
Universal Army. London: Verso, pp. 1-96. 
 
Jameson F (2016b) Badiou and the French Tradition. New Left Review 102: 99-117. 
 
Judis J (2016) The Populist Explosion. How the Great Recession Transformed American and European 
Politics. New York: Columbia Global Report. 
 




Krugman P (2016) Our unknown country. The New York Times. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016/supreme-court-hardball 
(accessed 2 September 2017).  
 
Laclau E (2005a) On Populist Reason. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau E (2005b) Populism: What’s in a name? In Panizza F (ed) Populism and the mirror of democracy. 
London: Verso, pp. 32-49. 
 
Lears J (2018) What we don’t talk about when we talk about Russian hacking. London Review of Books, 40 
(1): 15-18.  
 
Lee BX (ed) (2017) The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental Health Experts 
Assess a President. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Luce E (2017) The siege of western liberalism. Financial Times, 5 May. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/c7444248-3000-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a (accessed 2 September 2017). 
 
McAdams DP (2016) The mind of Donald Trump. The Atlantic. Available at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/ (accessed 8 
January 2018). 
 
Moffiitt B and Tormey S (2014) Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. Political 
Studies 62: 381-397. 
 
Mouffe (2013) Agonistics: Thinking the world politically. London: Verso. 
 
Mudde C and Kaltwasser CR (2017) Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Müller JW (2016) Capitalism in one family. London Review of Books 38(23): 10-14. 
 
Müller JW (2017) What is Populism? London: Penguin Books.  
 
Nagle A (2017) Kill All Normies. Online Culture from 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-right. 
Winchester: Zero Books. 
 




Parker S and Parker M (2017) Antagonism, accommodation and agonism in Critical Management Studies: 
Alternative organizations as allies. Human Relations 70(11): 1366-1387. 
 
Povinelli EA (2011) Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Reynié D (2016) The specter haunting Europe: “Heritage populism” and France’s National Front.  
Journal of Democracy 27(4): 47-57. 
 
Robinson S and Bristow A (2017) Populist responses to austerity and cultural change: Brexit, Trumpism and 
beyond. Organization 24(3): 433-438. 
 
Roitman, J (2014). Anti-Crisis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Shatz A (2017) Wrecking Ball. London Review of Books 39(17): 17-21. 
 
Smith D (2017) Why Trump still needs the love of the crowd: ‘This is like medicine to him’. The Guardian, 6 
August. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/05/donald-trump-rallies-supporters-
west-virginia (accessed 2 September 2017). 
 
Stoler AL (2016) Duress. Imperial Durabilities in Our Times. Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Streeck W (2016) How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. London: Verso. 
 
Streeck W (2017) The return of the repressed. New Left Review 104: 5-18. 
 
Tally R (2014) Fredric Jameson. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Vonnegut K (1969/1991) Slaughterhouse-Five. London: Vintage 
 
Zeit, J (2017) Does the white working-class really vote against its own interests? Politico, 31 December. 
Available at: https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/31/trump-white-working-class-history-216200  
 






i The song can be found on his Mule Variations album and in this link as a YouTube clip: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMqxNPsfN50. 
ii The painting can be found at the Nationalgalerie in Berlin and in this link: 
https://mydailyartdisplay.wordpress.com/2011/01/22/the-pillars-of-society-by-george-grosz-3/ 
iii Maggie Nelson already wrote back in 2011 (p.131): ‘it has become an almost comedic phenomenon, that 
as mainstream news reporting in the United States continues its slide away from fact and into a partisan 
cesspool of spin, invective, and infotainment, news programs have started to blanket themselves with a “just 
the facts ma’am” brand of sloganeering’.  
iv The tombstone with the words ‘Everything was beautiful, and nothing hurt’ from Slaughterhouse 5 
(Vonnegut, 1991: 122) can perhaps serve as iconic image for this demand that the present abolish itself, 
making way for a return to a gentler, less confusing imagined past in which American Greatness is restored. 
v It is important to note, however, that Trump did not win the popular vote and his victory is, at least partially, 
due to structural discrimination built into the US electoral system (see e.g. Campbell, 2018), and thus his 
mobilization of ’the people’, as we address it here, is more of a rhetorical than a political feat.  
                                                             
